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Resilience to exogenous shocks in environmental management regimes 
in the Arctic – lessons learned from survivors 
A changing climate will impact not only the environment but all levels of 
governance thereof, including the context of the close to 400 multilateral 
environmental management agreements signed since the year 2000. For the 
Ocean, researchers project that the increasing sea surface temperatures will 
facilitate large changes in the marine food web, including large shifts in 
distribution patterns of marine life towards the north and cooler waters. These 
new distributions of marine resources have political consequences. But to what 
extent will these climatic stressors act as an external "shock" to existing 
management regimes in the Arctic? How resilient are the current Arctic 
management regimes? We illustrate these questions with a particular on-going 
case of the sharing of the Northeast Atlantic mackerel quota. The negotiation 
difficulties among Norway, the EU, Faroe Islands, Iceland, Greenland and Russia 
initiated by the the vast expansion its distribution pattern gives us a hint of what 
is to come if business-as-usual scenarios of the International Panel on Climate 
Change (IPCC) come to pass. We further focus our analysis on the Svalbard 
Fisheries Protection Zone, to learn from other environmental management 
regimes that have lived through exogenous shocks. Finally, we discuss the impact 
exogenous shocks have had on three different environmental management 
regimes: the impact of the ozone hole on the ozone regime, the impact of Black 
Forest death (“Waldsterben”) on the Convention on Long-range Transboundary 
Air Pollution, and the impact on Regional Fisheries Management Organizations 
of the creation of Exclusive Economic Zones under the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea. 
Keywords: Svalbard; regime resilience; exogenous shocks; Arctic; climate 
change 
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Introduction 
Between the years 2000 and 2017, almost 400 multilateral environmental management 
agreements and amendments thereto were signed around the world1. These ranged in issue areas 
from the development and exploitation of navigation on the Senegal river to the prevention of 
marine pollution from oil spills and beyond. As the worldwide consensus on climate change 
culminated with one of these agreements, the ratification of the Paris Agreement in 2015, sea 
surface temperatures were at record highs in many areas, and for most of the Norwegian Sea (ca 
1.38 million km2) and the Barents Sea (ca 313,000 km2) 2, 3. 
For fisheries, research suggests that if we continue with business as usual scenarios 
(RCP8.5)4, more than 800 species of marine fish and invertebrates will shift towards the poles 
65% faster than if we fall under the low-emission scenario of 2 degrees Celsius suggested by the 
Paris Agreement 5, 6. In fact, warming waters have already made changes to the habitat of phyto- 
and zooplankton, and forced these temperature-sensitive species to move farther north, with the 
stock of the Northeast Atlantic mackerel following these crucial food sources. Researchers have 
been studying this northward shift of the mackerel, as well as other important commercial fish 
species like cod, capelin and haddock. These are now all present to one extent or another as far 
north as the Svalbard archipelago in the Arctic, in the waters of the Svalbard Fisheries 
Protection Zone (SFPZ)7, 8, 9.  
Another marine resource moving towards Svalbard is the snow crab that has become a 
highly valuable species for commercial fishery. In the Barents Sea, the distribution pattern of 
the snow crab is west of Novaya Zemlya. However, based on the yearly stock assessment 
cruises carried out by the Institute of Marine Research of Norway (IMR), the prediction is that 
the snow crab stock will move west in the Barents Sea towards most areas around Svalbard and 
Franz Josef Land. In addition, estimates suggest that the value of the snow crab fishery on the 
Norwegian continental shelf may exceed the Norwegian cod fisheries in the future, with annual 
catch values of 1-5 billion NOK by 202010.  
In light of a number of different climatic stressors such as these, that have uncertain 
effects on ecosystem goods and services, and the management thereof, we explore scenarios of 
resilience of environmental institutions and management regimes in the Arctic by looking 
specifically at some of these examples and how they affect the arguably11, 12  vulnerable 
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governance regime in place in the marine territory surrounding the archipelago of Svalbard in 
the High North. We ask what may happen to environmental regimes in the Arctic such as this 
one that may undergo exogenous shocks in the future, brought forth by either climatic or non-
climatic stressors, and how do they adapt – if they do?  
To explore this scenario, the following paper looks to institutional theory and compare 
our case of Svalbard with environmental management regimes that have persued through 
exogenous shocks in the past to analyze what lessons can be learned and applied to the Svalbard 
regime. The change in distribution of both mackerel and snow crab is already testing the 
political waters of multi-lateral sharing of marine resources in the area based on historical 
quotas and fishing rights. To discuss how these changes may or may not become an "exogenous 
shock" to governance mechanisms already in place when affected further by climatic stressors 
such as rising sea surface temperatures, we will assess the experiences to exogenous shocks of 
three management regimes and their responses to exogenous shocks, or external “stressors”: 1) 
The impact of the ozone hole on the ozone regime (Montreal protocol), 2) the impact of Black 
Forest deaths (“Waldsterben”) on the Convention on Long-range Transboundary Air Pollution 
(LRTAP), and 3) the impact on North East Atlantic Fisheries Commission (NEAFC) of the 
creation of Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) under the United Nations Convention on the Law 
of the Sea (UNCLOS). In doing so, we gain an understanding on how regimes under influence 
of strong external forces lead to changes in the original functionalities of said regimes, and 
discuss to what extent the management regimes in the Arctic under external climatic stressors 
are robust enough to withstand the effects of the external environmental “shocks” to come, if it 
can adapt, and what it can learn from the experiences of those that have experienced similar 
externalities to their regime functionalities.  
We first discuss theories of institutional change in general, followed by a short 
description of the three management regimes and the exogenous factors that led to the changes 
in their functionalities and issue areas. We then introduce the water colund and continental shelf 
cases of mackerel and snow crab, and explore to what degree the insights from institutional 
theory and the three cases apply to the current case and the effects of the exogenous factors of 
increased sea surface temperature and resultant changes in marine stock sizes and distribution 
on the governance of the marine area and protected zone.  
Institutional theory 
Climate change and the resultant effects thereof may challenge existing environmental 
institutions13, 14, 15. One of the ways in which this may happen is through the effects of stressors 
from climate change  acting as exogenous environmental processes, or a critical junctures, for 
the given regime16. In doing so, these resultant stressors could in some cases be strong enough 
to challenge the premises upon which a given management regime was created in the first place 
and refashion the institutional policy choices of said institutions. Exogenous shocks, or 
punctuated equilibriums, such as these, usually come about after a period of institutional 
stability, where continuity and reproduction of the institution in question has taken place. Some 
argue that only a radical change can destabilize such a system, and cause the institutional 
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structure to be refashioned17. However, others argue that since not all changes to institutions are 
brought about by shocks to the system18, 19,  processes of change that are irrespective of 
institutional breakdown are also important to explore.  
An overview of some important concepts in institutional theory is in order. Kathleen 
Thelen is a researcher that introduced, defined and developed a number of explanations to 
mechanisms of incremental institutional changes over time20, 21, 22, 23, including that of the 
concept of institutional layering, which is relevant to the case of Arctic governance under 
climate change. This concept explains the gradual transformation of institutions whereby new 
elements are attached to existing structures which steadily changes their original functions. We 
can see evidence of institutional layering in for instance the amendments to a number of major 
regimes, such as that of the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution for Ships 
1973 and its 1978 Protocol (MARPOL), which came into force in 198324. This treaty was an 
answer to increasing marine pollution from the shipping industry, and attempted to strike a 
balance between the needs for marine protection as well as the need for economic efficiency of 
the shipping industry25 23. This environmental agreement has since had six annexes to its 
original text, and ninety-four amendments throughout the years until 2016, updating its original 
content with up to date information and new realities26. Similarly, the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)27 has also undergone gradual changes over the 
years, as evidenced by the 1995 Fish Stock Agreement28 supplement to the agreement, and the 
current UN high level negotiations (2018–2019) on the protection of Biodiversity in Areas 
Beyond National Jurisdiction (BBNJ)29. The former was a layering of new issue area after it 
became clear that the original agreement did not address the issue of straddling fish stocks and 
highly migratory fish stocks well enough, resulting in a second major international agreement, 
which together with the original now constitute the Law of the Sea regime30. In these cases, the 
regime is undergoing incremental changes resulting from changes in society and in the 
technological innovation which enabled commercial fishers to change their exploitation patterns 
and behaviours that challenged the existing treaties. As such, from these examples, we 
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understand that institutional layering emphasizes that the existing institution is not replaced but 
has new elements layered onto its existing structure.  
Though the concept of institutional layering itself has also changed over time, and 
appears to have some flexibility of interpretation as well, we choose, for the purposes of this 
study, to use Thelan’s 2004 definition establishing that "layering...involves the crafting of new 
elements onto an otherwise stable institutional framework"31.  It offers us the opportunity to 
explore, when considering our three cases of institutional change, not what changed in and of 
itself, but how, when and why it changed - and what the real meaning of this change was for the 
institution in question. It also opens up the discussion to what actors or instruments were 
layered onto existing institutions to develop a gradual change in its framework32.  
Given that we do not know yet how gradual or sudden climatic and non climatic 
stressors may be in the Arctic, or how either of these scenarios will affect the institutions in 
place, we also need to discuss exogenous shocks. It is often institutions that can be considered 
functionalist, in terms of being created for solving collecting action problems33, that are most 
affected by shocks that rock their system. This is because these institutions often are path 
dependent. This latter expresses the self-reinforcing process that is created by the dynamics of 
the institutional rules of the game. Often, the particular path chosen on the development of a 
given regime renders it difficult, if not impossible, to make reversals and choose differently 
with regards to the institutional choice of said regime. This is because the capabilities of a given 
institution, which is the framework within which the policy maker must work, were decided at a 
different time in a different place, when there were different environmental pressures in place 
and as such, the regime is not prepared for sudden changes that impact the rules of the game34. 
This theory therefore suggests that the institution in question under this scenario will continue 
and persist, until there is an external or internal shock to the system that breaks down this path, 
creating a punctuated equilibrium35  and forces it towards institutional change. These punctuated 
equilibriums usually take place very fast, after a long period of institutional stability36, and as 
such can have a great effect on the regime in question and the ecosystem goods and services for 
which they were initially created to protect.  
Case studies: International treaties responding to change 
The importance in differentiating between these two particular branches of institutional theory – 
gradual layering and exogenous shocks - is to develop the framework within which we will 
discuss and explore the scenario of institutional change in the Arctic under climate change.  
Using these theories and concepts as a baseline for our discussion and as frameworks for 
looking at comparable cases, we explore three institutions that changed because of external 
events, both environmental and institutional, and explore how resilient they were to change and 
how they adapted to external factors. We then look at ongoing and potential changes to the 
governance regime of the Svalbard fisheries protection zone in the Arctic and compare it to how 
other regimes have responded to different external factors that ended with institutional changes.  
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The Montreal protocol 
An infamous and often referenced international agreement that is considered successful is from 
the early 1970s, when the first scientific publications on ozone depletion as a result of ozone-
depleting substances such as chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) and other were published37, leading to 
the now well known Montreal protocol. The “hole” in the ozone layers that led to global outrage 
came about because of the public fear of millions of new cases of skin cancer patients and other 
human health effects from less ozone in the atmosphere. Besides skin cancer, other health fears 
included infectious diseases, suppression of the immune system, and eye disorders. Due to these 
ill health effects related to the decrease of the protective ozone layer, the topic of ozone 
depletion started to be taken seriously in public and political arenas38. This also demonstrates 
how environmental norms gained strength and diffused as the scientific evidence on the 
negative effects mounted39, 40. This agenda setting happened despite anti-regulatory campaigns 
by the CFC-producing industries and industries using CFCs in the United States. By the mid- to 
late 1970s, several countries had in fact banned the use of CFCs in aerosols, including the 
United States, Canada, Sweden, Norway and Denmark41.  In 1985, the Vienna Convention for 
the Protection of the Ozone Layer, ratified by 193 parties, officially declared the need to protect 
the ozone layer, though there were no obligations yet concerning the use and production of 
CFCs. The window was open to resume negotiations, though, and shortly thereafter, the 
Antarctic Ozone hole was discovered42. This led to a new sense of urgency which increased 
pressure both nationally and internationally to resume negotiations,.  
Two years later, in 1987, the Montreal Protocol On Substances that Deplete the Ozone 
Layer, was signed43, making it the first global environmental treaty addressing a still only 
theoretical environmental challenge44, since, at the time of the Montreal Protocol, the cause of 
the Antarctic ozone hole had not yet been proven. It nevertheless had a tangible impact on 
public opinion, in that that the hole was observable on model visualizations and a powerful 
symbol, which in the end galvanized public opinion at the global level on the importance of 
banning CFCs45. Ironically, there was never an actual "hole" in the ozone layer above the 
Antarctic. The term was used as a metaphor to describe areas where ozone concentrations had 
dropped below historical thresholds. Measurements of this "hole" started in 1979, when the 
concentration was at 194 Dobson units, just below the historical threshold of 220 Dobson units. 
In 1983, the concentration fell, and it continued to fall rapidly to 124 in 1985. In 1991, the 
concentrations fell below 100 Dobson units for the first time. The lowest measured 
concentrations were in 1994 when they fell to 73 Dobson units. After the ratification of the 
Montreal protocol, though, 90% of global production of CFCs was eradicated within a decade46, 
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and the area and depth of the Antarctic ozone "hole" has since stabilized, and scientists predict 
that it will recover to a natural state around 204047.  
This metaphorical "hole" in the ozone layer was the catalyst, or perturbation, that 
pushed the international community from the non-committal initial Vienna Convention to the 
new and successful Montreal Protocol. This “shock” to the system drove public perception, and 
there through influenced the institutional change by galvanizing the world opinion on its 
importance. In 1987 the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer was 
adopted, and it entered into force in 1989 and has since been ratified by 193 nations.  The 
Montreal Protocol was the first international agreement that looked to solve global atmospheric 
challenges48, with a specific goal of a 50% reduction in consumption and production of CFCs by 
1999 but with a 10 year grace period granted developing countries.  
The Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution (LRTAP) 
Rather than experiencing a shock, like the Vienna protocol did, the 1979 Convention on Long-
range Transboundary Air Pollution (LRTAP) had a number of changes through gradual 
institutional layering over the decades since the treaty was signed, including 15 amendments 
and eight protocols49. The agreement has a regional focus and is based on cooperation between 
49 parties that are members of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe.  
The formation of the LRTAP was a result of concerns about acid rain, focusing on 
emissions of sulphur oxide (SO2), which were initially primarily linked to the acidification of 
Scandinavian lakes and rivers and put on the agenda by Norway and Sweden, and an unlikely 
ally, the Soviet Union. In its initial form, the original agreement was a compendium of broad 
principles and promises of joint research activities, but it lacked any kinds of concrete measures 
that would actually curb acid rain50. In fact, it was not until the 1985 Protocol On The Reduction 
Of Sulphur Emissions Or Their Transboundary Fluxes By At Least 30 Per Cent To The 
Convention On Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution that concrete measures were taken to 
curb these emissions. Prior to this, the problem of acid rain was not deemed serious enough by 
the European nations, with the exception of Norway and Sweden, since only the Scandinavian 
countries were affected by the results and Germany was a major producer of sulphur oxides.  
The LRTAP did not become a priority for most signatory countries51  until 1982, when 
it was found that long-range air pollution was damaging the German forests as well, and not 
only Scandinavian lakes. These deaths were coined "Waldsterben" (forest deaths) by the 
German biologist Bernhard Ulrich. In a New York Times article from 1984, the author 
describes the phenomena in the following way:  
 
"As fir needles turn yellow and spruce branches sag 
limply, the industrial poisoning of West Germany's 
forests is assuming the dimensions of a spiritual, as  
well as an environmental, catastrophe."52  
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A "Green movement" ensued, and consequently influenced the environmental 
narratives of most German political parties. The German government therefore announced at the 
1982 Stockholm Conference on Acidification of the Environment, that they, too, were joining 
the Norwegian, Swedish and USSR efforts to seek SO2 reductions. This was a great win for the 
consortium, that not only gained a powerful ally, but also gained the commitments and support 
of one of the largest producers and polluters of SO253.  In addition to the outrage and the green 
movement, technological solutions were also developed at that time that would allow 
governments and industries to solve the problems of not only sulphur oxides but also nitrogen 
oxides. The Sulphur protocol, signed by 19 parties in Helsinki in 1985, had clear goals and it 
was easy to verify that parties upheld their obligations of a 30% reduction of SO2 emissions. In 
fact, all parties combined reduced their emissions by more than 50%.  
The North East Atlantic Fisheries Commission (NEAFC) 
UNCLOS is a major international agreement signed in 1982 after nine years of intense 
negotiations. The Law of the Sea established the concept of Exclusive Economic Zones 
(EEZs)54 that extended the state´s sovereign rights to explore, exploit, conserve and manage the 
natural resources located within the water column, on the seabed, or under the soil 200 miles 
beyond its land territory. This gave a state the right to hinder foreign fishing vessels from 
exploiting resources within their 200 mile zone, but also brought with it the responsibility of the 
state to enforce the Law of the Sea by boarding and inspecting foreign ships traveling within 
their EEZs if these were considered suspicious55.   
Prior to the establishment of EEZs, however, this was a job undertaken through 
collaborations between coastal states that started already in the 1930s. Meetings in ICES from 
1936-1947 led to the 1953 establishment of a management organization named the ´Permanent 
Commission´, which in 1963 changed its name to NEAFC. The organization originated from a 
number of conferences on fishing activities and gears, starting with an international conference 
aptly names the “Overfishing Conference”, focusing on mesh regulations and size limits for 
fishing, arranged in London in 1936. A follow-up conference was held the following year, in 
1937, but progress was interrupted by WWII. In 1943, an international fisheries conference was 
again held, in London once more, where the purpose was to “… update and extend the scope of 
existing fisheries agreements relating to policing of fishing grounds, rules of navigation for 
fishing vessels, and the prevention of disputes between fishermen of different countries”. At this 
time, there were a number of conventions in place for fisheries in the North East Atlantic, and 
one of the aims was to develop a new document that could encompass all of those before it, and 
be more holistic. In 1946, after the war, the third “Overfishing Conference”, later named the 
Overfishing Convention, was held in London. The regulations established in this convention 
included landing size for demersal fish species, as well as minimum mesh sizes, and it led to the 
establishment of a management committee that was the pre-cursor of NEAFC, namely the 
“Permanent Commission”. In 1953, the 1946 Convention for the Permanent Commission held 
its first meeting, and ten years later, its name was changed to the North East Atlantic Fisheries 
Commission. The responsibilities of NEAFC were then further extended to pelagic fisheries56.  
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The current form of NEAFC was established by the Convention on Future Multilateral 
Cooperation in North-East Atlantic Fisheries, which entered into force in 1982, replacing the 
North East Atlantic Fisheries Convention of 1959, which in turn had replaced the 1946 
Convention for the Regulation of Meshes and Fishing Nets and the Size Limits of Fish. After 
the 1995 Fish Stock Agreement, a number of changes were made within NEAFC to adapt to its 
role as a Regional Fisheries Management Organization (RFMO) and role as regulators of 
straddling fish stocks57. The establishment of the 200 mile EEZ in 1977 marginalized the role of 
NEAFC in fisheries management by depriving it of its main functions in terms of resource 
management with the majority of its original management area being placed under state control, 
and as such, though it was a gradual process, it nevertheless was an institutional shock in that it 
had such large implications. The Fish Stock Agreement58, however, reinstated some of this lost 
significance and gave back some control and enforcement measures to NEAFC that improved 
its legal foundation in terms of fisheries resource management and gave more resilience in the 
adaptation to the new ocean regime59.  
Comparing “survivors” to future scenarios in the Arctic  
These three examples of management regimes that have undergone change either through 
layering (Montreal protocol), exogenous shocks (NEAFC) or a combination thereof (LRTAP) 
serve as comparative cases to the scenario of potential institutional changes because of climatic 
and non climatic stressors in the Arctic. The distance to the Arctic fisheries is great, from any 
nation. Vessels wanting to travel to Svalbard must for example be in transit for two days and 
travel "...400 nautical miles extra to and from the fishing grounds."60. A high catch rate is 
therefore critical in order to offset the travel costs for the fishers. This catch rate and the value 
of it could be a result of warming waters, with an increase in valuable marine species migrating 
to these waters. However, the two examples of mackerel and snow crab also touch on two 
different aspects of the marine resource harvesting in the area, namely the water column and the 
continental shelf, either of which alone, or together, can act as exogenous shocks forcing new 
branches or completely break the one on right now.  
We examine the case of Svalbard Fisheries Protection Zone (SFPZ, initiated in 1977) as 
an example of a management regime that could be changed because of the effects of climate 
change. We hypothesize that climate change will affect the resilience of the SFPZ regime and 
possibly change it into a different version of itself or something entirely new. We emphasize 
however that this is different from the Svalbard Treaty itself, which is a Treaty that is applied to 
the archipelago itself and the surrounding territorial waters61, and not the 200 nm zone 
surrounding this area. In light of this, we introduce two examples of exogenous shocks, or 
punctuated equilibriums, that could impact national and international policies. These two shocks 
are 1) IPCC projections of increased sea temperature and melting ice cover in the Arctic and 
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subsequently 2) migrations of fish stocks and marine resources further north facilitated by these 
warmer, ice-free waters. We postulate that these cases are significant tests to the SFPZ that is 
likely to change the current institutional collaboration in the Arctic and apply institutional 
theory and the comparative cases of the Montreal Protocol, LRTAP and NEAFC to illustrate 
this.  
The Northeast Atlantic mackerel dispute – the water column shocks 
The water column shock under climatic stressors refers to the implications of new commercially 
valuable fish stocks migrating or changing distribution patterns from previously agreed upon 
areas, leading to a necessity of reallocation of quota rights both between nations, and within 
nations. An example of this is the multi-billion mackerel industry, where the stakes are high for 
a piece of the total allowable catch. Serious international conflicts in fisheries are not new, 
however: In the 1950s and 1970s, Iceland's "Cod Wars" with the United Kingdom on fishing 
rights of North Atlantic intensified with the deployment of military frigates. This time around, 
mackerel is the high-stakes species. No military frigates have been deployed, but that's not to 
say the conflict is not serious, both politically and ecologically. 
Starting in 2007, the Northeast Atlantic mackerel fish stock increased its distribution 
area62, 63, 64 in dramatic  ecological and political fashion. The current scientific consensus is that 
the distribution expansion is a result of warmer waters and more suitable habitat for mackerel 
and their preferred prey.  
The expansion of the prevalence of mackerel beyond Norwegian and EU EEZs and into 
Icelandic, Faroe Islands, and Greenland waters provoked an interstate conflict, still ongoing at 
the time of this writing. This relates especially to Iceland and Greenland, two countries who 
historically never had a quota for the stock, and their blatant exclusion from the fisheries 
agreement that currently includes Norway, the EU and the Faroe Islands. However, with the 
advent of the species in their EEZ waters, Iceland claimed their right to harvest it despite 
protests from the historical fishing rights owners Norway, Faroe Islands and the European 
Union. An important institutional aspect here is the fact that the International Concil for the 
Exploration of the Sea (ICES), the world’s oldest inter-governtmental science organization 
(founded in 1902) delivers one overall scientific quota, or total allowable catch, for the entire 
NEA mackerel stock annually. This scientifically-based quota, a collaboration among ICES 
member states, including Norwegian, European and Icelandic scientists, must be shared by all 
the coastal states.  
The start of the current mackerel quota dispute occurred in 200965 when Iceland 
unilaterally decided to increase their mackerel quota to 130,000 tons from a normal level of 
2,000 tons, which constitutes a 6500% increase. Iceland still stands outside the TAC sharing 
agreement that includes the EU and Norway (since 1999) and now also the Faroe Islands (since 
2014), but Iceland still fishes mackerel within its EEZ (legally according to the UNCLOS). 
Thus, NEA mackerel has been systematically overfished since 2009. At the time of this writing, 
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the projected catch for NEA mackerel in 2019 is 160% over the ICES scientifically-advised 
quota66.   
This continued overharvesting practice could lead to an economic and ecological 
collapse of this commercially and ecologically important species, as infamously experiences in 
the collapse of the Atantic cod in East Canada and the herring in the North Sea67,  68, 69, 70 . The 
root cause of the overfishing of mackerel lies with the failures of international agreements 
governing it, including the United Nations 1982 Law of the Sea Convention, the 1995 
Straddling Fish Stocks Agreement, the 1980 North East Atlantic Fisheries Convention and the 
Coastal States' bi- and trilateral agreements. All these agreements fail to prescribe how to share 
the current widely distributed mackerel stock with new states71, 72, 73, in this case Iceland, when 
the distribution patterns change from previously accepted positions. This is just a taste of what 
may come in the future, when new species are projected to continuously enter an area where 
there are decades of stability in fisheries negotiations between nations74, 75.  
Snow crab and the continental shelf shock 
Where the water column shock is known and discussed often as consequences of higher ocean 
temperatures, the Continental Shelf shock. is not equally infamous, as it is a more quiet shock 
that is slow moving, but still has enormous implications if challenged. The Continental Shelf 
principle and its relation to the Svalbard has been discussed in detail earlier76. However, we will 
mention the main points that are important to keep in mind when considering the exogenous 
shocks to the path dependency of the institution. The Continental Shelf treaty, as opposed to the 
Svalbard Treaty specifically, is linked to the necessity of securing and allocating rights to oil 
and gas (hydrocarbon) deposits sub-soil or seabed. After a number of nations unilaterally had 
made claims to the continental shelf in their areas77, 78, 79, preparatory work towards an 
international management regime commenced in 1950s. This resulted in the 1958 Geneva 
Convention on the Continental Shelf80.  Claims to the continental shelf offers an exclusive right 
of the coastal states to resources on and below the sea floor on the shelf, specifically, mineral 
                                               
66 Lindbæk, Makrellkvoten overfiskes trolig med 160 prosent i år (In English: “The mackerel quota is 
likely overfished by 160 percent this year”). 
67 Charles, 'The Atlantic Canadian groundfishery: Roots of a collapse'. 
68 Boreman et al., Northwest Atlantic Groundfish: Perspectives on a Fishery Collapse. 
69 Dickey-Collas et al., 'Lessons learned from stock collapse and recovery of North Sea herring: a review'. 
70 Dickey-Collas, Longer term perspective on management science behind the boom, collapse and 
recovery of the North Sea herring fishery. 
71 Ørebech, 'The “Lost Mackerel” of the North East Atlantic—The Flawed System of Trilateral and 
Bilateral Decision-making'. 
72 Dankel et al., 'Allocation of Fishing Rights in the Northeast Atlantic Ocean: Discussion paper. 
TemaNord.2015:546, Nordic Marine Think Tank.'. 
73 Jensen et al., 'Game theory and fish wars: The case of the Northeast Atlantic mackerel fishery'. 
74 Gattuso et al., 'Contrasting futures for ocean and society from different anthropogenic CO2 emissions 
scenarios'. 
75 Pinsky et al., 'Preparing ocean governance for species on the move',---. 
76 Tiller and Nyman, 'The clear and present danger to the Norwegian sovereignty of the Svalbard 
Fisheries Protection Zone: Enter the snow crab'. 
77 United Kingdom, TREATY between His Majesty in respect of the United Kingdom and the President of 
the United States of Venezuela relating to the SUBMARINE AREAS OF THE GULF OF PARIA. 
78 United States of America, Proclamation 2667 of September 28, 1945: Policy of the United States with 
Respect to the Natural Resources of the Subsoil and Sea Bed of the Continental Shelf (Acronym: 
Truman Proclamation). 
79 Persand, A Practical Overview of Article 76 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. 
80 United Nations, Convention on the Continental Shelf, done at Geneva, on 29 April 1958  
resources such as oil and gas, as well as sedentary fish species, a category to which snow crab 
has been found to belong to81.  
The second resource that has recently emerged within the Svalbard Fisheries Protection 
zone, and causing governance instability, is the snow crab, or the Queen Crab (Chionoecetes 
opilio). A commercial fishery for this species started in Canada in the 1960s and grew 
exponentially between 1997 and 2004. Today, Canada has the largest snow crab industry in the 
world, and commercial fishers landed approximately 100,000 tons of snow crab in 2013 in 
Canada’s northwest Atlantic. This is the equivalent to two thirds of the entire global supply of 
the crab, and the fishery is also the second largest behind lobster on the East Coast of Canada82, 
83. The species has not customarily inhabited the Barents Sea, and it was very surprising for 
scientists when the first snow crab was registered in the Barents Sea in 1996. The first 
speculation centered on the crab having been brought there with ballast waters84. This first 
registration consisted of five individuals (five males and one female), and they were caught in 
trawl catches at the Goose Bank in the eastern part of the sea within the Russian EEZ by 
Russian fishers85, 86. In 2003 then, two snow crabs were caught in Norwegian waters near the 
northernmost region of Finnmark87. It has since then regularly been caught as bycatch in 
trawling (commercial and scientific) as well as by coastal gillnet fisheries in the central and 
northern Barents Sea88, 89.  
In the Barents Sea, snow crab is today mostly spread west of Novaya Zemlya. However, 
based on the yearly stock assessment cruises carried out by the Institute of Marine Research of 
Norway, the prediction is that the snow crab stock will continue growing and spreading in the 
Barents Sea towards most areas around Svalbard and Franz Josef Land. Estimates suggest that 
the value of the snow crab fishery may exceed the Norwegian cod fisheries in the future, 
though, with annual catch values of 1 - 5 billion NOK by 202090. Given that this is a new 
resource that does not have a fisheries management plan, the Norwegian Ministry of Trade, 
Industry and Fisheries has put a total ban on Norwegian vessels harvesting snow crab within the 
Norwegian EEZ and the Svalbard Fishery Protection Zone. The same ban holds in international 
waters, with the exception of vessels that have been given special dispensation from the 
Norwegian Directorate of Fisheries91. The ban on harvesting the snow crab in the SFPZ presses 
pause on possible objections from other signatories of the Svalbard Treaty while the Norwegian 
government discusses possible strategies. These relate to not only a precautionary limit for 
sustainable exploitation of the species, but also a consideration of both legal frameworks and 
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diplomatically strategic paths given the historical disagreements internationally over the legality 
of Norway's pursuits in the zone.  
Some issues are critical to consider for the snow crab case. The first, with regards to the 
Norwegian claim of a continental shelf area that includes Svalbard, Article 48, Article 121, and 
paragraph 3 of UNCLOS specify that archipelagos and islands are also entitled to continental 
shelves92, 93. Most nations, however, consider that Svalbard has its own continental shelf, which 
falls under the Svalbard Treaty provision. These states made reservations about the extent to 
which Norway was able to claim the continental shelf around Svalbard immediately after the 
submission to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) on the 27th of 
November 200694, 95, 96, 97. Russia specified this in its response to the Norwegian claim, in 
consenting to the Commission examining the application, but specifying that:  
 
"Nothing in this note shall prejudice the position of the Russian Federation 
towards the Spitsbergen archipelago and its continental shelf. The 
recommendations of the Commission in regard to the submission made by 
Norway shall be without prejudice to the provisions of the Treaty 
concerning Spitsbergen of 1920 and, accordingly, to the regime of the 
maritime areas adjacent to Spitsbergen."98  
 
Spain, likewise, also emphasized the Svalbard Treaty, and referred to a Note Verbale sent to 
Norway expressing their position of Svalbard maritime zones. In the aforementioned note, they 
explicitly said that: "...principles of liberty of access and non-discrimination are applicable to 
any maritime zone that might be defined from Svalbard, including, as appropriate, the 
continental shelf, both within and beyond a distance of 200 nautical miles...". They further 
emphasized in their letter that "...Spain considers that the Paris treaty fully applies to those 
regions and reserves its right to the resources of the continental shelf that may be defined 
around Svalbard, including the extension thereof"99.  
Discussion and Conclusions 
In the current aricle, we have explored the experiences to exogenous shocks and gradual 
changes of three management regimes and their responses to these external “stressors to better 
understand on how regimes under influence of strong external forces that force changes to their 
original functionalitie. The discussion is then applied to two cases of external shocks to 
management regimes in the Arctic, namely the mackerel and snow crab cases, to explore how 
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these regimes may be resilient and adaptable to climatic stressors, and what we can learn from 
how our case examples adapted. 
Before discussing the cases, we acknowledge that the types of shocks and distrubances 
to the agreements discussed in this article are not identical. In the case of Svalbard and the snow 
crab, we explored whether or not the regime is resilient enough to withstand the disturbance of a 
new species that does not have a management plan yet but that potentially may have great 
commercial value and is coveted by many commercial fishing nations. The same species is 
furthermore a complication in that it also is a proxy for mineral extraction in the same area. In 
the case of mackerel, on the other hand, we look at an example of an already valuable fishery 
that is changing its fishing grounds and moving through the water column into areas that are 
goverened by other states than those that originally shared it, causing difficulties in 
management. Both of these events are examples of what researchers project under climate 
change in the Arctic – new species move in and old species start moving around to new areas – 
making current regimes unstable and uncertain, and under pressure.  
The Montreal protocol and the LTRAP cases are comparative cases that, though they 
are not about fisheries, represent examples of how new regimes were created or evolved from 
old ones and as such, proving their initial states were not resilient to the shocks they 
experienced. NEAFC, similarly, experienced a similar shock with the creation of the EEZs 
decimating the managmenet area over which it was originally intended, and the regime had to 
adapt to this to still have a role in ocean governance in the North East Atlantic.  
The regime creation angle is one of the scenarios we are exploring with the Svalbard 
fisheries protection regime and the snow crab as well as that of mackerel, as examples of how 
regimes can adapt to future stressors from changing fish stocks distribution patterns. Our 
analysis centers on the questions of to what degree the experiences of the ozone treaty, the 
LRTAP, and NEAFC can give us an indication of potential effects institutional (creation of 
EEZs) or environmental (ozone and forest deaths) “shocks” may have on ocean governance in 
the Arctic under the effects of climatic stressors.  
In the case of the continental shelf shock, and snow crab in the Svalbard fisheries 
protection zone, this is further complicated by the fact that neither Iceland nor Russia 
acknowledge the rulings of the International Court of Justice100. In this case, one may argue that 
a political solution, namely the creation of international management regimes for marine species 
in the area since the initial state of the current regime may not be resilient to the shock it is 
experiencing with the snow crab entereing the area.  This may not lead to changes in the 
Svalbard Fisheries Protection Zone per se; just a bypass, or a re-naming thereof; an institutional 
conversion in terms of name only and not functionality.  
Arctic states may furthermore avoid the challenges with existing agreements by 
negotiating an independent international cooperative ecosystem-based regime for all new 
marine resources whose distributions patterns have changed, making them available for harvest 
in the North Atlantic. This could be an advantageous option to states, since avoidance of 
outright conflict is critical, and the scarcity of fish in many areas of the world, as a consequence 
of climate change101, 102, may be a catalyst for conflict when other nationals search for fish in 
the high north103. Therefore, in order to avoid outright conflict with some of their closest 
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neighbors, and to maximize their profits regarding the harvest of these new marine resources, an 
international regime may be in the best interest of many.  
We have seen that institutional theory opens the door to other scenarios in addition to a 
regime specifically designed for these new species and resources. Institutional layering would 
add new elements to the management of marine species in the future. Norway may for example 
bypass the current self-imposed decision to use the Svalbard Treaty element of historical fishing 
rights as a criterion for quota allocations. The zone itself has over the years become 
institutionalized as a management zone under Norwegian authority, and there are few dangerous 
signs of a negative tendency to this trend that will challenge this management regime. The years 
of Norwegian presence as sovereign in this area has created a situation of stability that, we 
argue, no nation wishes to challenge or disturb. This has also been proven historically, with 
countries who have tried to come up with a peaceful solution for centuries for the Archipelago. 
Informal understandings regarding the appropriate behavior of the actors in a given setting are 
critical, as are activities that have sprung out as a result of implementation attempts104.  
Therefore, instead of ignoring the problem and creating exogenous institutions, the 
institution can adapt to the change and layer new elements on top of existing structures.  For 
example, states could use institutional layering to incorporate new resources into the annual 
discussions between Norway and Russia over quotas amongst others in the Svalbard Fisheries 
Protection Zone, if mackerel and snow crab (and all other species that may become climate 
migrants) were only to be harvested in the zone and the Barents Sea. However, given that the 
distribution patterns of these fish will likely lead them in and out of economic zones as well as 
international waters on their migratory route, the issue goes beyond a Norway-Russia 
discussion, and must include more nations.  
Given the earlier mentioned uncertainty about fish distribution and migratory patterns 
under different climate change scenarios, however, creating a separate regime for managing the 
up-and-coming species may still be the only solution that most nations can live with. This 
would be similar to the changes that the ozone regime underwent when it went from a non-
committal regime to one in which the environmental challenge was treated seriously by all 
actors at a global level. In this case, it would change the functionality of the regime in place, and 
develop one that is different in that the area would not be unilaterally managed by Norway but 
by a number of countries acting together.  
In face of a rapidly changing climate in the High North, current treaties and regimes 
will no doubt be challenged and new models of resource allocation among coastal states and 
treaty signatories should be developed to promote stewardship instead of conflict. Future 
research on the topic should therefore concentrate on what type of regime these migratory 
trends must allow for, and how it can be effective in protecting not only the species themselves, 
but all other ecosystem goods and services they depend on. It is a task that will demand a lot of 
interdisciplinary research that encompasses the integrated ecological, economic and geo-
political complexities necessary to ensure the future of the High North as a rich sustainable 
fishery area for future generations that is accessible to more than just the few climate change 
"winners".   
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